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Abstract I propose a cheap-talk model in which the sender can use
private messages and only cares about persuading a subset of her au-
dience. For example, a candidate only needs to persuade a majority
of the electorate in order to win an election. I find that senders can
gain credibility by speaking truthfully to some receivers while lying
to others. In general settings, the model admits information transmis-
sion in equilibrium for some prior beliefs. The sender can approximate
her preferred outcome when the fraction of the audience she needs to
persuade is sufficiently small. I characterize the sender-optimal equi-
librium and the benefit of not having to persuade your whole audience
in separable environments. I also analyze different applications and
verify that the results are robust to some perturbations of the model,
including non-transparent motives as in Crawford and Sobel (1982),
and full commitment as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
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A politician running for office only needs half plus one of the votes. A seller
with a capacity constraint only needs to persuade a certain number of consumers
to purchase her product. A person looking for a job may apply to many positions,
but she only has to convince a single firm to extend an offer. This paper studies
the problem of an informed sender who can engage in private conversation with
many receivers and cares about the behavior of some but not all of them. My
main finding is that having to persuade only part of an audience significantly
facilitates information transmission and increases persuasion power.
Let us examine the first example in more detail. Suppose a politician (the
sender, she) is running for office. All voters (the receivers, he) share the same
preferences. The unknown state of the world equals either 0 or 1. Each voter will
vote for the politician if his expectation about the state of the world is greater
than 1/2. The voters share a common prior expectation in the interval (1/3, 1/2).
Suppose that the politician learns the true state of the world, and can engage in
private cheap talk with each voter via targeted ads. I claim that, if there electorate
is large enough, then there exists an equilibrium in which she wins the election
for sure, regardless of the state.
This is possible because the politician only needs to persuade half plus one
of the electorate in order to win the election. She can do so with the following
strategy. If the state is indeed 1, then she will let every single voter know this
fact. If the state is 0, then she will randomly choose half plus one of the voters
and tell them that the state is 1, despite the fact that it is not.
A voter that receives a message saying that the state equals 1 knows that this
could be a lie. However, he also knows that he would be more likely to receive
this message if it was actually true. Hence, the message conveys some information.
When the population is large enough, it conveys sufficient information to overturn
prior beliefs arbitrarily close to 1/3. In that case, every voter who receives this
message prefers to vote for the politician.
I study a general cheap-talk model with many ex-ante homogeneous receivers
and both public and private communication. I depart from the literature by
assuming that there are n receivers, but the sender only cares about the highest
n0 < n actions taken. In such cases, the utility of the sender can be completely
determined by strict subsets of the receivers. Thus, she only needs to persuade
part of her audience in order to maximize her utility. I call the gap between n
and n0 an excess audience.
I find that the sender can influence the behavior of receivers in equilibrium in a
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very wide class of environments as long as there is an excess audience (Proposition
4). In some environments, effective information transmission is only possible if
there is an excess audience (Proposition 6). When the fraction of the audience
that the sender cares about is small enough, she can achieve her preferred outcome
in equilibrium (Proposition 3).
I characterize the sender’s benefit from having an excess audience under a
separability assumption (Theorem 5). Lipnowski and Ravid (2018) characterize
the sender’s maximum equilibrium payoff when the sender cares about her entire
audience in terms of her value function. The value function is the highest payoff
the sender can obtain when all the receivers behave optimally given their poste-
rior beliefs. Under Lipnowski and Ravids’ assumptions, the sender’s maximum
equilibrium payoff equals the quasiconcave envelope of her value function. I find
that an additional step is needed in the presence of an excess audience.
This step involves a generalization of the politician’s communication strategy
described above. The sender starts by randomly and privately splitting her au-
dience into a target audience that she wants to persuade, and the rest of the
receivers. Receivers in the target audience always receive whichever message in-
duces the behavior most favorable to the sender. The communication strategy
for the rest of the receivers is chosen to maximize the credibility of the message
sent to the target group. This message conveys information because individual
receivers are not told whether they were assigned to the target audience.
This kind of strategy allows the sender to implant a fixed posterior belief in
a fixed proportion of the audience regardless of the state. I say that such beliefs
are attainable. The set of attainable beliefs admits a simple and computationally
tractable characterization (Lemmas 1 and 2). When the sender wishes to persuade
her entire audience, the only attainable belief is the prior. However, the set of
attainable beliefs is strictly increasing with the size of the excess audience. The
missing step to characterize the sender’s maximum equilibrium payoff is to replace
the original value with the maximum value over the set of attainable beliefs.
The benefit from having an excess audience is always non-negative. It is strictly
positive for some prior beliefs. And it is monotone in the fraction of the audience
that the sender wishes to persuade. Moreover, as the fraction of the audience
that the sender cares about converges to zero, the set of attainable beliefs totally
covers the interior of the simplex. Consequently, the maximum equilibrium payoff
approaches the best feasible payoff for the sender (Proposition 7).
Section 4 applies the techniques developed in the paper to analyze the election
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example, financial advice, and the role of advertisement for crowdfunding. Sec-
tion 5 considers two extensions of the model. First, I analyze a model with full
commitment as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and the information design lit-
erature (Bergemann and Morris, 2016, Taneva, 2019). I find a characterization of
the maximum sender equilibrium payoff in the full-commitment game, assuming
that the state space is finite. The characterization is similar to the one for the
cheap-talk game. The only difference is that it uses the concave envelope of the
value function instead of the quasiconcave envelope.
I also analyze an example with the classic quadratic loss functions from Craw-
ford and Sobel (1982). This example does not satisfy all the assumptions required
for my characterization. However, it is still possible to use strategies with a ran-
dom target audience in order to transmit information. When the fraction of the
audience that the sender cares about is small, the sender can approximate her
preferred outcome and transmit large amounts of information to most of her au-
dience in equilibrium. Unlike the case without an excess audience, information
transmission is possible for any degree of bias.
Since the seminal work of Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel, different authors
have found different mechanisms for an expert to gain credibility. Information
transmission is possible via cheap talk when incentives are not too misaligned,
or there are multiple senders (Battaglini, 2002), or multiple dimensions of infor-
mation (Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2010), or strategic complementarities (Levy
and Razin, 2004, Baliga and Sjöström, 2012), or the sender has transparent mo-
tives (Lipnowski and Ravid, 2018), among other reasons. An excess audience is
a novel mechanism which allows for information transmission in some settings in
which none of the aforementioned mechanisms operate.
Some authors have studied cheap-talk communication with multiple audiences.
However, this literature has focused on situations when the sender cares about the
actions of all receivers, either directly or indirectly. Farrell and Gibbons (1989)
showed that senders with multiple audiences sometimes prefer public communica-
tion and sometimes private communication. Goltsman and Pavlov (2011) show
that the sender might be strictly better off by combining both types of messages.
Hence, I allow the sender to use both private and public messages.
Basu et al. (2018) study the problem of an informed sender who employs cheap
talk to try to prevent an ethnic conflict. Their model has a large audience, and
the sender is allowed to use private messages. However, they restrict attention
to strategies that are anonymous, conditional on observed heterogeneity. This
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restriction precludes the strategies with random target audiences that I analyze.
Instead, they exploit preference complementarities in order to find an equilibrium
with effective information transmission.
There is a large body of literature using cheap talk to study information trans-
mission between politicians and electorates, dating at least as far back as Harring-
ton (1992). Some recent work in this area includes Schnakenberg (2015), Panova
(2017), Jeong (2019), and Kartik and Van Weelden (2017). Other recent papers
analyze the problem from the information design perspective, including Alonso
and Câmara (2016), and Chan et al. (2019). Within this literature, the papers
that assume talk is cheap focus on public messages. My contributions highlight
the importance of private anonymous communication (e.g., through social media).
1. Model
There is one sender s, and a set of receivers r ∈ R = {1, . . . , n}. The sender
and receivers share a common prior belief π0 about the true state θ0 ∈ Θ. The
sender learns the state. She then sends a private message mpr ∈ M to each
receiver r, and a public message m0 ∈M0 to all receivers. Each receiver observes
the compound message mr = (m0, m
p
r), but observes neither the state nor other
receivers’ private messages. Then, all receivers observe an uninformative public
sunspot ω0 distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. Finally, each receiver r chooses an
action ar ∈ A. All receivers have identical preferences. The utility of r depends
only on his own action and the state. It is given by uR(ar, θ). The sender’s utility
uS(a1, . . . , an) does not depend on the state.
I impose some technical restrictions.1 Each of A, Θ and M is a compact
separable metric space containing at least two elements. M0 and M are rich
1I adopt the following notational conventions throughout the paper. For each separable
metric space Y , BY denotes the Borel σ-algebra on Y , and ∆Y the set of probability measures on
(Y,BY ) endowed with the weak* topology. Given measures pi, τ ∈ ∆Y , pi ≪ τ denotes absolute
continuity, pi ∼ τ denotes equivalence, and dpi/dτ denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative of pi
with respect to τ . The support of pi is denoted by supppi. Given a setX , a function g : X → ∆Y ,
a point x ∈ X and an event Y ′ ∈ BY , let g(Y ′|x) := [g(x)](Y ′). Profiles of elements of X are
denoted by x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn. Throughout the paper, “a.s.” means “almost surely with
respect to pi0”.
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enough as to not restrict the set of equilibrium outcomes.2 The utility functions
are continuous.
I study the perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. Communication strategies,
receiver strategies, and updating rules are measurable maps µ : Θ→ ∆(M0×Mn),
αr : M0×M×[0, 1]→ A, and βr : M0×M → ∆Θ, respectively. Let µr( · |θ) denote
the marginal distribution overmr induced by µ(θ). Let BR(π) be the set of actions
that maximize
∫
Θ uR(a, θ) dπ(θ). An equilibrium is a tuple (α,β, µ) consisting a
profile of receiver strategies, a profile of updating rules, and a communication
strategy, such that
(i) For every receiver r, βr is consistent with Bayes’ rule given µr and π0.
(ii) αr(m,ω) ∈ A∗(βr(mr)) for every receiver r and compound message mr.
(iii) For every message profile m ∈ M0 ×Mn, if there exists a state θ such that
µ(m|θ) > 0, then m maximizes ∫ 10 uS(α1(m1, ω), . . . , αn(mn, ω)) dω.
1.1. Pivotal part of the audience
Throughout most of the paper, I maintain the assumption that the sender only
cares about the tail of the empirical distribution of actions taken by the receivers.
Assumption 1 A ⊆ R and there exists an integer n′ such that for every pair of
action profiles a and a˜, if a(i) = a˜(i) for every i ≥ n+ 1− n′, then uS(a) = uS(a˜),
where a(i) denotes the i-th order statistic of a.
Define the pivotal number of receivers to be the smallest integer n0 ∈ {0, . . . , n}
that satisfies the condition from Assumption 1. The pivotal fraction of the audi-
ence is γ0 = n0/n. The sender’s utility only depends on the highest n0 actions
taken by the receivers. If n0 = 0, then the sender is indifferent between all out-
comes. If n0 = n, then the sender cares about the entire empirical distribution of
receiver actions, but not about the identity of the receivers taking each action. If
0 < n0 < n then the sender cares about persuading fewer receivers than she can
talk to. In that case, I say that there is an excess audience.
2A sufficient condition is ‖M‖, ‖M0‖ ≥ ‖(A×Θ× [0, 1])n‖.
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Example 1 Recall the election example from the introduction. Letting ar = 1
denote a vote for the sender and ar = 0 a vote against her, the outcome of the
election is determined by the median action. If n is odd, then n0 = (n+1)/2 and
γ0 = (n+ 1)/2n. See Section 4.1 for more on this example.
Example 2 Suppose that the sender is the owner of a coffee shop from a local
franchise T . The shop is located at a tourist destination with several shops from
the same franchise. Most of the potential customers are travelers who are unfa-
miliar with the franchise and will buy coffee from it at most once. The utility
of a potential customer equals θ0 if they buy a coffee at one of the coffee shops
(ar = 1), and 0 otherwise (ar = 0). The sender’s profit is normalized to equal the
number of customers she serves. She can talk with n passing-by receivers, but
she can serve at most n0 of them. Receivers who choose ar = 1 but are beyond
the capacity of the sender, will buy their coffee at a different shop from the same
franchise. Therefore, uS(a) =
∑n0
i=1 a
(n+1−i).
2. Attainable posteriors
This section discusses two technical lemmas that drive the rest of the results.
Readers interested in the main results can skip to Section 3. A key step in my
analysis is to determine the maximum influence that the sender can exert over
the beliefs of part of her audience. If the sender wants to guarantee that there
are always n0 receivers having certain posterior beliefs, what values can these
posteriors take?
Definition 1 For γ ∈ [0, 1], a belief π′ ∈ ∆Θ is γ-attained by a communication
strategy µ and a profile of updating rules β if
(i) For every receiver r, βr is consistent with Bayes’ rule given µ.
(ii) For every state θ and every message profile m in the support of µ(θ), there
exists a set T ⊆ R such that ‖T‖ ≥ nγ and βr(mr) = π for all r ∈ T .
Say that π is γ-attainable if there exist µ and β that γ-attain it. Let Π(γ)
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be the set of γ-attainable beliefs. The following lemma characterizes the set of
γ-attainable beliefs using a set of linear restrictions on likelihood ratios.
Lemma 1 For all γ ∈ (0, 1] and π ∈ ∆Θ, the following statements are equivalent
(i) π is γ-attainable.
(ii) π0(E)π(E
′) ≥ γπ0(E ′)π(E) for any two events E,E ′ ∈ BΘ.
(iii) π ≪ π0 and dπ/dπ0 ∈ [γc0, c0] a.s. for some c0 > 0.3
Lemma 1 implies that Π(γ) is a nonempty closed and convex polytope. Note
that all possible posterior beliefs are 0-attainable, and only π0 is 1-attainable. All
the proofs are in the appendix. The following example shows one way to reach
the bounds from (ii).
Example 3 Suppose that Θ = {0, 1} and fix some γ = k/n with k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Identify each π ∈ ∆Θ with the probability p := π(1). The only two non-trivial
events to consider are {1} and {0}. Hence, part (ii) of Lemma 1 implies that a
belief is γ-attainable if and only if
γ
(
p0
1− p0
)
≤ p
1− p ≤
1
γ
(
p0
1− p0
)
. (1)
After some simple algebra, this implies that the set of γ-attainable beliefs corre-
sponds to
[
p0
p0 + (1− p0)/γ0 ,
p0
p0 + (1− p0)γ0
]
. (2)
The upper bound in (2) can be attained by the following communication strat-
egy. The sender first chooses a random target audience T ⊂ R consisting of
exactly k receivers. Each receiver r only observes one of two possible (compound)
messages mr = m
′ or mr = m
′′. The sender always sends message m′ to all the
receivers in T . Receivers not in T receive message m′ if and only if θ0 = 1. This
strategy results in the conditional probabilities µr(m
′|1) = 1 and µr(m′′|0) = γ0.
3Condition (iii) is a stronger version of the condition from Theorem 2.1 in Diaconis and
Zabell (1982). They find that a posterior belief pi is consistent with a prior pi0 and Bayes’ Rule
if and only if pi ≪ pi0 and dpi/dpi0 ≤ c0 a.s. for some c0 > 0.
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From Bayes’ rule, the posterior belief βr(1|m′) equals the upper bound of (2).
Since at least k receive message m′, this belief is γ-attained.
Lemma 2 below asserts that each extreme point of Π(γ) corresponds to a par-
tition of states into only two blocks. States in one block have increased likelihoods
relative to the prior, and states in the other block have decreased likelihoods. This
characterization makes Π(γ) computationally tractable. It is particularly advanta-
geous in monotone environments when the sender would always prefer to increase
the receivers’ beliefs about the state.
Lemma 2 For any γ ∈ (0, 1], a belief π ∈ ∆Θ is an extreme point of Π(γ), if and
only if there exists an event E+ ∈ BΘ such that for every event E ∈ BΘ
π(E) =
π0(E ∩ E+) + γπ0(E \ E+)
π0(E+) + γπ0(Θ \ E+) . (3)
Example 4 Suppose that Θ = {1, 2, 3} and π0 = (1/2, 1/3, 1/6). The prior like-
lihood ratios are π0(1)/π0(2) = 3/2, π0(1)/π
(3) = 3, and π(2)/π(3) = 2. It
follows from part (ii) of Lemma 1 that a posterior π is 1⁄2-attainable if and only if
π(1)/π(2) ∈ [3/4, 3], π(1)/π(3) ∈ [3/2, 6], and π(2)/π(3) ∈ [1, 4]. These con-
ditions correspond to the cones spanning from each vertex of the simplex in
Figure 1. Π(1/2) is the shaded irregular hexagon surrounding π0. The vertex
π′ = (1/3, 4/9, 2/9) is given by (3) with E+ = {θ3, θ2}. It maximizes ∫Θ θ dπ(θ)
subject to π ∈ Π(1/2).
Example 5 Suppose θ0 is distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. What is the γ-attainable
belief that maximizes the expectation of the state? Theorem 32.3 in Rockafellar
(1970) implies that the maximum is attained at an extreme point of Π(γ). Lemma
2 thus implies that the maximizer π∗ takes the form (3), and it must be the case
that E+ = [θ1, 1] for some θ1 ∈ (0, 1). It follows that
∫ 1
0
θ dπ∗(θ) =
∫ θ1
0
γθ
γθ1 + 1− θ1dθ +
∫ 1
θ1
θ
γθ1 + 1− θ1dθ =
γθ21 + 1− θ21
2(γθ1 + 1− θ1) . (4)
This expression is maximized when θ1 = 1/(1 +
√
γ), and the maximum is∫
Θ θ dπ
∗(θ) = 1/(1 +
√
γ). Note that this maximum equals 1/2 when γ = 1,
equals 1 when γ = 0, and is strictly decreasing in γ.
9
bb
b
b
b
b
p′ π0
3
√
2/5
2
√
2/5
θ = 1
θ = 2
θ = 3
Figure 1 – 1⁄2-attainable beliefs for Example 4.
3. Information transmission and persuasion
3.1. Persuading a small part of an audience
It is possible to exert great influence over very small fractions of an audi-
ence. Suppose that the sender’s utility is maximized by a constant action profile.
Further suppose that this action profile is a best response to a belief π∗ with a
Radon-Nikodym derivative bounded both above and away from zero. Lemma 1
implies that π∗ would be γ-attainable for sufficiently low values of γ. Hence, when
the sender only cares about small fractions of her audience, she would be able to
reach her preferred outcome in equilibrium. Formally,
Assumption 2 There exist an action a∗ and a belief π∗ such that a∗ ∈ BR(π∗)
and uS(a
∗, . . . , a∗) ≥ uS(a) for every action profile a.
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Assumption 3 π∗ ≪ π0, and there exist two numbers 0 < ν ≤ ν¯ < ∞ such that
dπ∗/dπ0 ∈ [ν, ν¯] a.s..4
Proposition 3 Under assumptions 1–3 there exists γ¯ = γ¯(π0, π
∗) ∈ (0, 1) such
that if γ0 ≤ γ¯, then the game admits an equilibrium in which the sender obtains
her preferred outcome.
3.2. Effective information transmission
I have assumed that the sender has transparent motives, in that her preferences
do not depend on the state and are thus common knowledge. Cheap-talk models
with transparent motives often allow for some information transmission in equi-
librium. See, for instance, Theorem 1 in Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) and
Proposition 1 in Lipnowski and Ravid (2018). The question I address is whether
the sender can transmit sufficient information in order to influence the behavior
of her audience to her benefit.
Let v0 denote the sender’s value function. That is, v0(π) specifies the maximum
utility that the sender could obtain if all receivers shared a posterior π and acted
optimally,
v0(π) = max
{
uS(a)
∣∣∣ ar ∈ BR(π) for all receivers r} . (5)
Say that an equilibrium exhibits effective information transmission if the sender’s
expected equilibrium payoff is strictly greater than v0(π0). An excess audience
allows for effective information transmission for some prior beliefs under two mild
sensitivity assumptions that rule out trivial cases.
Assumption 4 uS(a
∗, . . . , a∗) > uS(a
′, . . . , a′) for every action a′ 6= a∗, and there
exists π′ ∈ ∆Θ such that a∗ 6∈ BR(π′), π′ ≪ π∗, and there exist two numbers
0 < ν ′ ≤ ν¯ ′ <∞ such that dπ′/dπ∗ ∈ [ν ′, ν¯ ′] a.s..5
Proposition 4 Under assumptions 1, 2, and 4, if there is an excess audience, then
there exists a nonempty set P = P (π∗, π′, γ0) ⊆ ∆Θ such that the game has an
4If ‖Θ‖ < +∞, Assumption 3 holds if and only if supppi0 = supppi∗.
5If ‖Θ‖ < +∞, the last condition is satisfied whenever supppi′ = supppi∗.
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equilibrium with effective information transmission as long as π0 ∈ P . Moreover,
if ‖Θ‖ < +∞, then P has a nonempty interior.
3.3. Sender-optimal equilibrium under separability
The sender’s maximum equilibrium payoff v∗ is the maximum utility that the
sender can obtain in any equilibrium. This section characterizes v∗ under the
following separability assumption.
Assumption 5 There exist a strictly increasing function US : A→ R such that
uS(a) =
1
n0
n0∑
i=1
US
(
a(n+1−i)
)
. (6)
The characterization relies on two operators defined on the set of upper-
semicontinuous functions from beliefs to sender payoffs. First, envq v is the qua-
siconcave envelope of v. That is, envq v is the pointwise-minimum, quasiconcave
and upper semicontinuous function that majorizes v. Second, att v gives the max-
imum of v arising from γ0-attainable beliefs, i.e.,
att v(π) = max
{
v(π′)
∣∣∣ π ∈ Π(γ0, π)} , (7)
where Π(γ0, π) is the set of beliefs that would be γ0-attainable if π0 = π. Intu-
itively, envq v operates by “flooding the valleys” while att v is obtained by “widen-
ing the hills.” See the left and center panels of Figure 2 in Section 4.2 for an
example.
Theorem 5 Under assumptions 1 and 5, v∗ = att envq v0(π0).
Lemma 1 implies that att envq v0 = envq v0 when γ0 = 1. Hence, Theorem 5
reduces to Theorem 2 in Lipnowski and Ravid (2018) in that case. However, the
two results differ whenever there is an excess audience and the assumptions from
Proposition 4 hold. The difference between the results corresponds to the benefit
from an excess audience defined in the following subsection.
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3.4. The benefit from an excess audience and private communication
What happens to the sender’s payoff when she has to persuade a larger or
smaller fraction of her audience? Proposition 6 below gives sufficient conditions
under which an excess audience is necessary for effective information transmission.
These conditions are satisfied by the election, excess capacity, and labor market
applications in Section 4.
Proposition 6 Under assumptions 1 and 5, if v0 is quasi-concave and there is
an equilibrium with effective information transmission, then there is an excess
audience.
Define the benefit from excess audience to be the difference between v∗ and
the maximum equilibrium payoff to the sender in an alternative environment with
n0 = n. It follows from Theorem 5 and Lemma 1 that this benefit equals the
difference between v∗ and envq v0(π0). Moreover, Assumption 5 guarantees that
both v∗ and envq v0(π0) are measured in the same units.
Proposition 7 Under assumptions 1–5, there exist γ¯ = γ¯(π0, π
∗) > 0 and a
nonempty set P = P (π∗, π′, γ0) ⊆ ∆Θ such that the benefit from excess audience
(i) is non-negative and non-increasing in γ0,
(ii) is strictly positive whenever π0 ∈ P and γ0 < 1, and
(iii) equals u˜S(a
∗)− v0(π0) whenever γ0 ≤ γ¯.
Consider an alternative model in which the sender can use only public messages.
She still cares only about the actions of part of her audience. However, public
messages only allow her to persuade either all of the receivers or none of them. The
benefit from private communication is the gap between v∗ and the maximum sender
equilibrium value in this alternative model. Without private messages, the only
γ0-attainable belief is the prior. Hence, the benefit from private communication
coincides with the benefit from excess audience under Assumption 5.
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4. Examples
4.1. Targeted political campaigns
Social media allows politicians to personalize campaign advertising at a low
cost. Suppose that the sender is a politician running for office. Each receiver r
will either vote for the sender (ar = 1) or against her (ar = 0). The state is either
0 or 1, and voters share a common prior belief with p0 := π0(1) ∈ (0, 1). The
sender knows the state and engages in private cheap talk with each receiver via
targeted online ads.
The sender wins the election if she obtains a super-majority of at least γ ∈ (0, 1)
of the votes. Her utility is 1 if she wins the election, and 0 otherwise. The pivotal
number of receivers is n0 = min{n′ | n′ > nγ}. All receivers share the same
preferences. Receiver r prefers ar = 1 if and only if his posterior beliefs satisfy
pr := πr(1) ≥ η, where η ∈ (0, 1) is a fixed parameter.
When is victory attainable for the politician? She wins the election when the
posterior beliefs of at least n0 voters satisfy πr > η. From (1), there exists a
γ0-attainable belief satisfying this condition if and only if
η
1− η <
1
γ0
(
p0
1− p0
)
. (8)
In such cases, there exists an equilibrium in which the sender always wins the
election regardless of the state. The condition is satisfied whenever: (i) the voters
prior attitude towards the sender is positive (p0 is high), (ii) the voters have a low
bar for the sender (η is small), or (iii) the sender only needs a small fraction of
votes in order to win the election (γ0 is small). For the case γ = 1/2 and η = 1/2,
(8) reduces to the condition π0 > 1/3 from the introduction.
4.2. Financial advice
The state θ0 ∈ {0, 1} indicates the winner of a rigged boxing match. The
sender is an informed bookie who knows the state and would like to persuade the
receivers to place large bets. However, she is time constrained. She can talk with
n receivers, but she can handle at most n0 ≤ n bets. The rest of the bets will be
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handled by other bookies. The total utility of the sender equals V0+ηV1, where Vθ
is the total volume of bets on θ that she handles, and η > 1 is a fixed parameter.
Each receiver starts with the same initial wealth w > 0 and places a bet
ar ∈ [−w,w]. A positive bet represents a bet on θ0 = 1 whereas a negative bet
represents a bet on θ0 = 0. Bets on different states have different exogenous net
returns ρ0, ρ1 > 0, with ρ0ρ1 < 1. Receivers have logarithmic Bernoulli utility
functions. For example, a receiver with beliefs π that places a bet on θ0 = 1
maximizes
∫
Θ
uR(ar, θ) dπ(θ) = p log(w + ar) + (1− p) log(w − ar), (9)
subject to ar ∈ (0, w], where p = π(1).
This example deviates slightly from our environment because the sender cares
about both tails of the distribution of actions. However, the conclusion of Theorem
5 still applies. The receivers’ best response correspondence is given by
BR(π) =


w
ρ1
[(1 + ρ1)p− 1] if p ≥ 1
1 + ρ1
−w
ρ0
[(1 + ρ0)(1− p)− 1] if p ≤ ρ0
1 + ρ0
0 otherwise
. (10)
The function att v0 can be computed by substituting the bounds from (2) into
uS(BR(p)). Figure 2 illustrates envq v0 (left), att v0 for γ0 ∈ {1/3, 1/10} (middle),
and v∗ for γ0 = 1/3 (right). The gap between the envelopes in the left and
right panels corresponds to both the benefit from private communication and the
benefit from having more receivers than capacity to take bets. This example can
also be interpreted as the problem of a time-constrained financial adviser who
takes prices as given and sells multiple negatively correlated instruments.
4.3. Crowdfunding
The sender owns a start-up company financed via an online crowdfunding
platform. The receivers are potential backers. Each receiver pledges an investment
level ar ≥ 0. Say that the company is backed if ∑r∈R ar ≥ η, where η > 0 is a
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Figure 2 – Value functions for the bookie example with w = 0.5, η2 = 2, ρ1 = 1/2,
and ρ0 = 1/5. Left panel: envq v0. Center panel: att v0 with γ0 = 1/3
(red) and γ0 = 1/10 (blue). Right panel: v∗ with γ0 = 1/3.
fixed parameter. The sender gets a payoff of 1 if the company is backed and a
payoff of 0 otherwise.
A backed company might be a success or a failure. The company succeeds
with probability θ0 ∈ [0, 1] if it is backed, and it fails for sure otherwise. The
prior belief about θ0 is uniform on [0, 1]. The sender is informed about θ0 and can
communicate with the receivers via private cheap talk.
If the company is not backed, the pledged investments are refunded. If the
company is backed and fails, all the investments are lost. Otherwise, the investors
receive a net return ρ > 0. The receivers have logarithmic Bernoulli utility func-
tions. Hence,
uR(ar, θ) = −θe−(w+ρar) − (1− θ)e−(w−ar) (11)
if the company is backed, and uR(ar, θ) = −e−w otherwise.
Lemmas 1 and 2 can be used to construct equilibria in which the sender benefits
from having an excess audience. Note that the company will be backed if at least
n′ receivers to pledge at least η/n′. If η/n′ < 1, a receiver who is optimistic
enough about θ0 would be willing to pledge that amount. Optimistic beliefs can
be (n′/n)-attained as long as n is sufficiently larger than n′.
Proposition 8 If n ≥ 12η/wρ2, then the crowdfunding game has a perfect Baye-
sian equilibrium in which the company is backed for sure regardless of the state.
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5. Extensions
5.1. Information design
Suppose now that the sender chooses and commits to a communication strategy
before learning the state of nature. This timing corresponds to the information
design paradigm used by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). See also Bergemann
and Morris (2016). Define a commitment protocol to be a tuple (α,β, µ) satisfying
conditions (i) and (ii) in the definition of an equilibrium. The sender’s maximum
commitment payoff v∗∗(p) is the maximum utility that the sender can obtain in
any commitment protocol.
Since every equilibrium is a commitment protocol, Propositions 3 and 4 con-
tinue to hold in the game with commitment. Also, it is possible to obtain a
geometric characterzation of v∗∗. Let env v0 denote the concave envelope of v0,
that is, the pointwise-minimum, concave function that majorizes v0.
Theorem 9 If ‖Θ‖ < +∞ and Assumption 5 holds, then v∗∗ = att env v0(π0).6
Figure 3 illustrates this result for the election example with γ0 = η = 1/2.
The figure on the left panel shows env v0, which corresponds to the maximum
commitment value without an excess audience (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011).
This would also be the maximum commitment value for the sender if she was
restricted to use only public messages. The middle panel shows v∗ = att v0. The
right panel shows v∗∗. The benefit from commitment is thus given by the gap
between the right and the middle panel. The benefit from an excess audience
under commitment is given by the gap between the right and the left panel.
5.2. Lack of transparent motives
Assuming that the sender does not care about the state simplifies the analysis
and plays a crucial role in the proof Theorem 5. However, an excess audience can
6The proof is based on Proposition 1 in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), which assumes a
finite state space. The discussion in Section 3 of their online appendix suggests that it might
be possible to extend the result to compact separable state spaces.
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Figure 3 – Commitment value for election example with γ0 = η = 1/2.
still be beneficial even when the sender’s motives are not transparent. Consider
the classic quadratic-loss game from Crawford and Sobel (1982), with the twist
that the sender faces an excess audience.
The state is distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. The receivers take actions in
A = [0, 1], and their utility is uR(ar, θ0) = −(θ0 − ar)2. The sender’s utility is
given by
uS(a, θ0) = − 1
n0
n0∑
i=1
(
θ0 + b− a(n+1−i)
)2
, (12)
where b > 1/4 is a fixed parameter measuring the bias of the sender relative to
the receivers. Suppose that the sender is only allowed to use private messages.
When n0 is equal to the total number of receivers, this is a particular instance
of the environment studied by Goltsman and Pavlov (2011). Since all the receivers
are biased in the same direction, there are only babbling equilibira. In contrast,
when n is much larger than n0, there can be effective information transmission.
Proposition 10 For all ǫ > 0, there exists n < ∞ such that whenever n ≥ n the
maximum sender equilibrium value in the quadratic-loss game is greater than −ǫ
if θ0 + b ≤ 1, and greater than −b2 − ǫ otherwise.
The proof is constructive. The sender uses a strategy based on a finite partition
of [0, 1]. She randomly splits the receivers into two groups of sizes n − n0 and
n0. She then reveals truthfully which block of the partition contains θ0 to the
members of the first group. She misleads the members of the second group so
that they choose her preferred action. When n is very large, it is possible to
18
construct incentive compatible equilibria of this sort with very fine partitions.
6. Closing remarks
When talk is cheap, information transmission requires the sender to be indiffer-
ent between all messages she uses. The present work identifies a novel mechanism
that can create indifference. When the sender only cares about persuading a strict
subset of her audience, she is indifferent between the messages she sends to the
rest of the receivers. It is possible for her to gain credibility by being truthful
with some receivers while lying to others. This mechanism can greatly facilitate
information transmission and increase the sender’s power to persuade.
The present work provides a full characterization of the sender-optimal equilib-
rium assuming that the receivers do not care about each other actions, the sender
has transparent motives, and her preferences are monotone and satisfy a separa-
bility condition. These restrictions greatly simplify the analysis. They make it
possible to characterize the set of equilibria combining the idea of γ0-attainability
with the techniques from Lipnowski and Ravid (2018). However, they appear to
be inessential for many of the results. The value of having a large audience in
general settings is left as an open problem.
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A. Proofs
A.1. Attainable posteriors
Proof of Lemma 1. If γ = 1, then the only belief that satisfies either (i), (ii) or
(iii) is π0, and it satisfies all three conditions. Hence, for the rest of the proof,
suppose that γ ∈ (0, 1).
((i) ⇒ (ii)) Suppose that π is γ-attained by some β and µ, and fix any two
events E ′ and E ′′. For each receiver r, let Mr be the set of compound messages
m such that βr(m) = π, and let χr be the indicator that mr ∈ Mr. Also let
χ =
∑
r∈R χr be the number of receivers whose posterior equals π. The prior beliefs
π0, communication strategy µ, and updating rule β induce a joint probability
measure Pr over θ0, mr, χr and χ.
First, suppose that π0(E
′)π0(E
′′) = 0. Since γ > 0, there exists at least one
receiver r such that Pr(Mr) > 0. This implies that π is obtained from π0 using
Bayes’ rule. Therefore, π ≪ π0 and (iii) holds with equality.
Now consider the case π0(E
′)π0(E
′′) > 0. Note that
E [χ|E ′ ] = ∑
r∈R
E [χr|E ′ ] =
∑
r∈R
Pr(Mr|E ′), (13)
where I am using short notation for the events θ0 ∈ E ′ and mr ∈ Mr. Since p′ is
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γ-attained by x and β, it follows that
Pr(χ ≥ γn|E ′) = 1 ⇒ E [χ|E ′ ] ≥ γn. (14)
Combining (13) and (14) it follows that
1
n
∑
r∈R
Pr(Mr|E ′) ≥ γ. (15)
Therefore there exists receiver r′ such that Pr(Mr′ |E ′) ≥ γ and Pr(Mr′) > 0.
It follows from Bayes’ rule that
π(E ′) =
π0(E
′) Pr(Mr′ |E ′)
Pr(Mr′)
and π(E ′′) =
π0(E
′′) Pr(Mr′ |E ′′)
Pr(Mr′)
. (16)
Taking the ratio of these equations yields:
π(E ′)
π(E ′′)
=
π0(E
′)
π0(E ′′)
· Pr(Mr′|E
′)
Pr(Mr′ |E ′′) ≥
π0(E
′)
π0(E ′′)
· γ
1
, (17)
which is equivalent to (ii) after rearranging terms.
((ii)⇒ (iii)) Now suppose that (ii) and take any event E such that π0(E) = 0,
and thus π0(Ω \ E) = 1. It follows that γπ(E)π0(Ω \ E) ≤ π(Ω \ E)π0(E) = 0.
Since γ > 0, this implies that π(E) = 0. Since E was arbitrary, this implies that
π ≪ π0. Hence, dπ/dπ0 : Θ→ [0,∞) exists by the Radon-Nikodym theorem.
Let ν¯, ν ∈ R+ ∪ {∞} denote the supremum and infimum of the support of
dp′/dπ0(θ0), respectively, i.e.,
ν¯ = sup
{
ν
∣∣∣ π0
(
dπ
dπ0
(θ) ≥ ν
)
> 0
}
(18)
and
ν = inf
{
ν
∣∣∣ π0
(
dπ
dπ0
(θ) ≤ ν
)
> 0
}
. (19)
By construction, 0 ≤ ν <∞, ν ≤ ν¯, and dπ/dπ0 ∈ [ν, ν¯] a.s.. If ν¯ = ν, then (iii) is
satisfied by c0 = ν¯. Otherwise, there exists ν1, ν2 ∈ R such that ν < ν1 < ν2 < ν¯.
I will show that if (ii) holds, then γν2 ≤ ν1 for any such pair. Therefore, γν¯ ≤ ν
and (iii) is satisfied by c0 = ν¯.
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Let E1 = {θ | dπ/dπ0(θ) ≤ ν1} and E2 = {θ | dπ/dπ0(θ) ≥ ν2}. Since dπ/dπ0
is measurable, so are E1 and E2. The way ν¯ and ν were defined implies that
π0(E1) > 0 and π0(E2) > 0. It follows from the Radon-Nikodym theorem that
π(E1) =
∫
E1
dπ
dπ0
(θ) dπ0(θ) ≤
∫
E1
ν1 dπ0(θ|E1) = ν1π0(E1). (20)
By a similar argument, it follows that
π(E2) ≥ ν2π0(E2). (21)
The fact that ν2 < ν¯ implies that π0(E2) > 0. Hence, we can divide (20) by (22).
Doing so yields
ν1
ν2
π0(E1)
π0(E2)
≥ π(E1)
π(E2)
≥ γπ0(E1)
π0(E2)
, (22)
where the second inequality follows from condition (ii). Therefore, γν2 ≤ ν1.
((iii)⇒ (i)) The proof is constructive. Suppose that condition (iii) holds and
let φ : Θ→ R be the function given by
φ(θ) =
1
c0
· dπ
dπ0
(θ), (23)
Also, let k = min{n′ ∈ N | n′ ≥ γn}. Consider the following communication
strategy. The sender always sends the same non-informative public message m0 =
∅. She chooses a random target audience T ⊆ R consisting of exactly k receivers
uniformly from {R′ ⊆ R | ‖R′‖ = k}. She sends the (compound) message m′ =
(∅, m1) with probability 1 to all receivers in T regardless of the state. For each
state θ ∈ Θ∗, each receiver r not in T receives message m′ with probability
µ(m′|θ, r 6∈ T ) = 1
1− γ (φ(θ)− γ) , (24)
and with the remaining probability he receives a different fixed compound message
m′′ = (∅, m2).7
Condition (iii) implies that there exists E∗ ∈ BΘ such that π0(E∗) = 1 and
7Note that the sender only uses two private messages, and that public messages are not
informative. These facts play no role in this proof, but they are used in the proof of other
propositions which rely on on this communication strategy.
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φ(θ) ∈ [γ, 1] for every θ ∈ E∗. Hence, µr(m′|θ, r 6∈ T ) ∈ [0, 1] for every θ ∈ E∗.
Therefore, µ is a well defined communication strategy (up to a null event, in which
it can be redefined arbitrarily).
A receiver r who receives message m′ does not know whether he belongs to T
or not. He thus updates based on the probability
µr(m
′|θ) = (1− γ)µr(m′|θ, r 6∈ T ) + γ = φ(θ) (25)
Now, take any event E ⊆ E∗ such that π(E) > 0 and note that
µr(m
′|E) =
∫
E
µr(m
′|θ) dπ0(θ|E) =
∫
E
φ(θ) · 1
π0(E)
dπ0(θ)
=
1
c0π0(E)
∫
E
dπ
dπ0
(θ) dπ0(θ) =
1
c0π0(E)
· π(E), (26)
where the second equality follows because π ≪ π0, and thus π0(E) > 0; the third
one follows from (23), and the last one follows from the Radon-Nikodim theorem.
Therefore, using Bayes’ rule yields
βr(E|m′) = π0(E)µr(m
′|E)
µr(m′)
=
1
c0µr(m′)
· π(E) ∝ π(E). (27)
Since E was arbitrary and π0(E
∗) = 1, it follows that βr(m
′) = π a.s.. Since
there are always at least nγ receivers with mr = m
′, we can conclude that π is
γ-attained by β and µ. 
The following lemma is an intermediate step to prove Lemma 2.
Lemma 11 Given any γ ∈ (0, 1), a γ-attainable belief π ∈ Π(γ) is an extreme
point of Π(γ) if and only if there exists c0 > 0 such that dπ/dπ0 ∈ {γc0, c0} a.s..
Proof. (⇐) Suppose that there exists c0 > 0 such that dπ/dπ0 ∈ {γc0, c0} a.s..
Lemma 1 implies that π0 is γ-attainable. Suppose towards a contradiction that
there exist π′, π′′ ∈ Π(γ) \ {π} and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that π = λπ′ + (1− λ)π′′.
Since π 6= π′, it follows that π0(dπ/dπ0(θ) 6= dπ′/dπ0(θ)) > 0. Without loss
of generality, suppose that π0(dp
′/dπ0(θ) > c
0) > 0. Lemma 1 then implies that
π0(dπ
′/dπ0(θ) ≤ γc0) = 0. Since π ∈ co{π′, π′′}, it follows that dπ′′/dπ0(θ) < γc0
a.s. on E− := {θ |dπ/dπ0(θ) = γc0}. Lemma 1 then implies that π0(dπ′′/dπ0(θ) ≥
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c0) = 0. In particular, dπ′′/dπ0(θ) < c
0 a.s. on E+ := {θ |dπ/dπ0(θ) = c0}. Hence,
dπ′′/dπ0 < dπ/dπ0 a.s.. However, this implies the following contradiction:
π′′(Θ) =
∫
Θ
dπ′′
dπ0
(θ) dπ0(θ) <
∫
Θ
dπ
dπ0
(θ) dπ0(θ) = π(Θ) = 1 H. (28)
Hence, we can conclude that π is an extreme point of Π(γ).
(⇒) Fix a belief π ∈ Π(γ). Let ν¯, ν ∈ R+∪{∞} be the supremum and infimum
of the support of dπ/dπ0(θ0), as defined in (18) and (19). The proof proceeds in
two steps. First, I will show that if π0(dπ/dπ0(θ) ∈ {ν, ν¯}) < 1, then π is not
an extreme point of Π(γ). Second, I will show that if ν 6= γν¯, then π is not an
extreme point of Π(γ).
Step 1—Suppose that π0(dπ/dπ0(θ) ∈ {ν, ν¯}) < 1. I will show that there exist
π′, π′′ ∈ Π(γ)\{π} such that π = 0.5π′+0.5π′′. Consequently, π is not an extreme
point of Π(γ).
Since π0(dπ/dπ0(θ) ∈ [ν, ν¯]) = 1 and π0(dπ/dπ0(θ) ∈ {ν, ν¯}) < 1, there ex-
ist numbers ν1, ν2 ∈ (ν, ν¯) such that ν1 ≤ ν2 and π0(E0) > 0, where E0 :=
{θ ∈ Θ | dπ/dπ0(θ) ∈ [ν1, ν2]}. Moreover, it follows from the definition of ν¯ and ν
that π0(E
0) < 1. Since π ≪ π0, it follows that π(Θ \ E0) > 0. Fix any number
ǫ > 0 such that
ǫ < min
{
1,
ν1
c1
,
ν¯ − ν2
ν¯ + c1
,
ν1 − ν
ν + c1
}
, (29)
where
c1 =
π(Θ \ E0)
π0(E0)
∈ (0,∞). (30)
Let π′ and π′′ be the beliefs given by
π′(E) =
∫
E
dπ′
dπ0
(θ) dπ0(θ) and π
′′(E) =
∫
E
dπ′′
dπ0
(θ) dπ0(θ), (31)
where dπ′/dπ0 : Θ→ R+ and dπ′′/dπ0 : Θ→ R+ are given by
dπ′
dπ0
(θ) =


dπ
dπ0
(θ) + ǫc1 if θ ∈ E0
(1− ǫ) dπ
dπ0
(θ) if θ 6∈ E0
, (32)
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and
dπ′′
dπ0
(θ) =


dπ
dπ0
(θ)− ǫc1 if θ ∈ E0
(1 + ǫ)
dπ
dπ0
(θ) if θ 6∈ E0
. (33)
It is straightforward to verify that dπ/dπ0 = 0.5dπ
′/dπ0 + 0.5dπ
′′/dπ0 and,
consequently, π = 0.5π′ + 0.5π′′. The first two bounds from (29) imply that
dπ′/dπ0 ≥ 0 and dπ′′/dπ0 ≥ 0 a.s.. Also, note that
π′(Θ) =
∫
E0
[
dπ
dπ0
(θ) +
ǫπ(Θ \ E0)
π0(E0)
]
dπ0(θ) +
∫
Θ\E0
(1− ǫ) dπ
dπ0
(θ) dπ0(θ)
= π(E0) +
ǫπ(Θ \ E0)
π0(E0)
· π0(E0) + (1− ǫ)π(Θ \ E0) = π(Θ) = 1, (34)
and, by a similar argument π′′(Θ) = 1. It follows that π′ and π′′ are well defined
beliefs and are absolutely continuous with respect to π0.
From the third bound in (29) it follows that
ǫ <
ν¯ − ν2
ν¯ + c1
⇒ ν¯ǫ+ c1ǫ < ν¯ − ν2
⇒ dπ
dπ0
(θ) + ǫc1 ≤ ν2 + c1ǫ < (1− ǫ)ν¯. (35)
Therefore, dπ′/dπ0 ∈ [(1 − ǫ)ν, (1 − ǫ)ν¯] a.s.. By a similar argument, the fourth
bound in (29) implies that dπ′′/dπ0 ∈ [(1 + ǫ)ν, (1 + ǫ)ν¯] a.s.. Lemma 1 implies
that ν ≥ γν¯ and thus π′ and π′′ are γ-attainable.
Step 2— Now suppose that dπ/dπ0 ∈ {ν, ν¯} a.s., but ν 6= γν. Again, I will
show that there exist π′, π′′ ∈ Π(γ) \ {π} such that π = 0.5π′ + 0.5π′′. Since the
argument is very similar to the one used in the previous step, I will omit some
details.
From Lemma 1, it follows that ν ≥ γν¯. Hence, it must be the case that
ν > γν¯ > 0. Since γ ≤ 1, this implies that ν 6= ν¯. Consider the events E+ =
{θ | dπ/dπ0(θ) = ν¯} and E− = {θ | dπ/dπ0(θ) = ν}. We know that π0(E+) +
π0(E
−) = 1. Moreover, π0(E
+) = 1 or π0(E
−) = 1 would only be possible if
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ν¯ = ν = 1. Therefore, π0(E
+)π0(E
−) 6= 0. Fix any ǫ > 0 such that
ǫ < min
{
ν,
ν¯
c2
,
ν¯ − ν
1 + c2
,
ν − γν¯
1 + γc2
}
, (36)
where c2 = π0(E
−)/π0(E
+) ∈ (0,∞).
Let π′ and π′′ be defined as in (31), but with dπ′/dπ0 and dπ
′′/dπ0 given by
dπ′
dπ0
(θ) =


ν¯ + ǫc2 if θ ∈ E+
ν − ǫ if θ ∈ E−
, (37)
and
dπ′′
dπ0
(θ) =


ν¯ − ǫc2 if θ ∈ E+
ν + ǫ if θ ∈ E−
. (38)
Using an analogous argument to the one used in Step 1, it is possible to verify that
π = 0.5π′ + 0.5π′′ and π′ and π′′ are well defined beliefs and π′, π′′ ∈ Π(γ). 
Proof or Lemma 2. (⇒) Let π be an extreme point of Π(γ). From Lemma 11,
there exists a constant c0 such that dπ/dπ0 ∈ {γc0, c0} a.s.. Let E+ = {θ ∈
Θ | dπ/dπ0(θ) = c0}. We have dπ/dπ0(θ) = γc0 a.s. on Θ \ E+. Hence, for every
event E,
π(E) =
∫
E∩E+
dπ
dπ0
(θ) dπ0(θ) +
∫
E\E+
dπ
dπ0
(θ) dπ0(θ)
= c0
[
π0(E ∩E+) + γπ0(E \ E+)
]
. (39)
In particular, for E = Θ,
π(Θ) = c0
[
π0(Θ ∩E+) + γπ0(Θ \ E+)
]
. (40)
Since π(Θ) = 1, it follows that c0 = 1/[π0(Θ ∩Θ+) + γπ0(Θ \Θ+)].
(⇐) Suppose that there exists a measurable set E+ ⊆ Θ such that π satisfies
(3) for every event E ∈ BΘ. I claim that the Radon-Nikodym derivative of π with
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respect to π0 is given by
dπ
dπ0
(θ) = c0
[
1(θ ∈ E+) + γ · 1(θ 6∈ E+)
]
, (41)
where c0 = 1/[π0(E
+) + γπ0(Θ \ E+)]. Indeed, note that for every event E,
∫
E
dπ
dπ0
(θ) dπ0(θ) =
∫
E∩E+
c0 dπ0(θ) +
∫
E\E+
c0γ dπ0(θ)
=
π0(E ∩ E+) + γπ0(E \ E+)
π0(E+) + γπ0(Θ \ E+) . (42)
Since γc0 ≤ dπ/dπ0(θ) ≤ c0 for all θ ∈ Θ, the result follows from Lemma 1. 
A.2. Effective communication and persuasion
Proof of Proposition 3. The threshold is given by γ¯ = ν/ν¯ ∈ (0, 1). If γ0 < γ¯,
then dπ∗/dπ0 ∈ [γ0ν¯, ν¯] a.s.. Lemma 1 thus implies that π∗ is γ0-attainable by
some β and µ. Consider any strategy profile α such that all receivers choose
best responses and, in particular, αr(mr, ω) = a
∗ whenever βr(mr) = π
∗. The
tupple (α,β, µ) constitutes an equilibrium. Let a be any action profile that
results with positive probability in this equilibrium. By construction, at least γ0
of the receivers satisfy ar = a
∗. Hence, it maximizes the sender’s utility. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let P ∗ = BR−1(a∗) be the set of beliefs in ∆Θ for which
a∗ is a best response. Also, for each λ ∈ [0, 1] let πλ = λπ′ + (1 − λ)π∗. Let
Λ∗ = {λ ∈ [0, 1] | πλ ∈ P ∗}. And let λ¯ = supΛ∗ and π¯ = πλ¯.
λ¯∗ is well defined an belongs to [0, 1] because 0 ∈ Λ∗, and thus Λ∗ 6= ∅.
Take any sequence (λk) in Λ
∗ such that λk −→ λ¯. For any event E, πλk(E) =
(1 − λk)π′(E) + λkπ∗(E) −→ (1 − λ¯)π′(E) + λ¯π∗(E) = π¯. Hence πλk converges
with respect to the weak topology to π¯ and, consequently, with also with respect
to the weak* topology. Since uR is continuous, P
∗ is closed. Since πλk(E) ∈ P ∗
for all k, π¯ ∈ Λ∗. Moreover, since P ∗ is convex, so is Λ∗. Therefore, we can write
Λ∗ = [0, π¯] with π¯ ∈ [0, 1).
Assumption 4 implies that π′ ∼ π∗ and, consequently, πλ ∼ πλ′ for all λ, λ′ ∈
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[0, 1]. Therefore, for every λ ∈ (π¯, 1] we have that
dπ¯
dπλ
=
dπ¯
dπ∗
· dπ
∗
dπλ
=
dπ¯/dπ∗
dπλ/dπ∗
=
λ¯dπ′/dπ∗ + (1− λ¯)
λdπ′/dπ∗ + (1− λ) , (43)
a.s., where the first and second equalities follow from the chain rule, and the third
one from the linearity of Radon-Nikodym derivatives. Define fλ : R+ → R by
fλ(x) =
λ¯x+ 1− λ¯
λx+ 1− λ. (44)
Notice that
dfλ
dx
(x) =
λ¯− λ
(λx+ 1− λ)2 < 0. (45)
Hence f is decreasing, and using the fact that dπ′/dπ∗ ∈ [ν ′, ν¯ ′] a.s., it follows
from (43) that dπ¯/dπλ ∈ [fλ(ν¯ ′), fλ(ν ′)] a.s..
Since there is an excess audience, there exists ǫ > 0 such that ǫ < (1−γ0)/(1+
γ0). Note that
lim
λ→λ¯+
fλ(ν
′) = lim
λ→λ¯+
fλ(ν¯
′) = 1. (46)
Hence, there exists a number δ > 0 such that if λ ∈ (λ¯, λ¯+δ), then fλ(ν ′), fλ(ν¯ ′) ∈
(1 − ǫ, 1 + ǫ). This implies that fλ(ν¯ ′)/fλ(ν ′) ≥ (1 − ǫ)/(1 + ǫ) > γ0, and thus,
dπ¯/dπλ ∈ [γfλ(ν ′), fλ(ν ′)] a.s.. Lemma 1 thus implies that if π0 = πλ, then π¯ is
γ0-attainable.
Fix some λ ∈ (λ¯, λ¯+δ), and suppose that π0 = πλ. Since πλ 6∈ P ∗, Assumption
4 implies that v0(π0) < uS(a
∗, . . . , a∗). The sender payoff equals uS(a
∗, . . . , a∗) in
the equilibrium constructed in the proof of Proposition 3. Hence, there is effective
information transmission in this equilibrium. Therefore, πλ ∈ P 6= ∅.
It remains to show that if ‖Θ‖ < ∞, then P has a nonempty interior. For
that purpose, let Π(γ0, π) denote the set of beliefs that would be γ0-attainable if
pi0 = π. From Lemma 1, it follows that
π ∈ Π(γ0, π¯) ⇔
(
π ≪ π¯ and dπ
dπ¯
∈ [γ0c0, c0]a.s.
)
⇔
(
π¯ ≪ π and dπ¯
dπ
∈
[
γ0
1
c0
,
1
c0
]
a.s.
)
⇔ π¯ ∈ Π(γ0, π). (47)
When γ0 < 1 and ‖Θ‖ < +∞, π¯ belongs to the interior of Π(γ0, π¯). Therefore,
there exists an open neighborhood P ′ ⊆ Π(γ0, π¯) of π¯ such that π¯ ∈ Π(γ0, π) for
all π ∈ P ′. Since π¯ belongs to the boundary of P ∗, it follows that P ′′ = P ′\P ∗ 6= ∅.
Since P ∗ is closed, P ′′ is open. And, from the same argument we used for πλ, it
follows that for every π ∈ P ′′ there exists an equilibrium with effective information
transmission. Hence, P ′′ ⊆ P . 
A.3. Sender-optimal equilibrium
Lemma 12 Every equilibrium value can be attained by a symmetric equilibrium
(α,β, µ) with αr = αr′, βr = βr′, and µr = µr′ for all receivers r and r
′.
Proof. Suppose that an equilibrium value u∗S is generated by some equilibrium
(α,β, µ). Consider the alternative strategies µ˜ and α˜ obtained by shuffling identi-
ties as follows. First, the sender draws a message profile m ∈M0×Mn using the
original distribution µ, but does not deliver them. Then, she shuffles the identity of
the receivers by drawing a permutation uniformly from {I : R→ R|I is biyective}.
She tells each receiver which function αI(r)(mI(r), · ) they would have used in the
original equilibrium with their swapped identity and message.
Note that αI(r)(mI(r), · ) would be a best response for r had he been told the
shuffling I and the message mI(r). The sure thing principle then implies that it is
also a best response when this information is garbled. The new strategy profile
thus induces an equilibrium that yields u∗S, and is symmetric. 
Lemma 13 (Lipnowski and Ravid (2018)) Under assumption 5, v∗ ≥ envq v0(π0).
Proof. Let u∗S = envq v0(π0). Consider the alternative environment with n˜ = 1
and u˜S(a) = us(a, . . . , a), and Θ, A, π0, and uR unchanged. Assumption 5 implies
that the value function of the alternative environment coincides with the value
function of the original environment. Since there is only one receiver, and the
sender’s utility does not depend on the state, this alternative environment satisfies
the assumptions in Lipnowski and Ravid (2018). Hence, by their Theorem 2, there
exists an equilibrium (α˜1, β˜1, µ˜1) which achieves u
∗
S.
Consider the replica of this equilibrium given by αr(m0, m
0
r , ω) = α˜1(m0, ω),
βr = β˜1, and µ(m, ∅, . . . , ∅|θ) = µ˜1(m|θ), where ∅ denotes a fixed non-informative
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private message. Note that this replica uses correlated strategies which guarantee
that all agents receive the same message and take the same action with probability
1. It is straightforward to verify that (α,β, µ) is an equilibrium of the original
environment and achieves u∗S. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Step 1 (att envq v0 is well defined)—Since Θ and A are com-
pact and uR is continuous, v0 is well defined and upper-semicontinuous. By
Lemma 5 in Lipnowski and Ravid (2018), envq v0 is also well defined and upper-
semicontinuous. From Lemma 1, Π is closed. Prokhorov’s theorem thus implies
that Π is compact. Hence, att envq v0 is well defined by Weierstrass’ extreme-value
theorem.
Step 2 (v∗ ≥ att envq v0(π0))—Let u∗S = att envq v0(π0). There exists some
πˆ ∈ Π such that u∗S = envq v0(πˆ). Consider the alternative environment with
n˜ = 1, u˜S(a) = US(a), π˜
0 = πˆ, and Θ, A, and uR unchanged. Assumption
5 implies that the value function of the alternative environment coincides with
v0. Since there is only one receiver, and the sender’s utility does not depend on
the state, this alternative environment satisfies the assumptions in Lipnowski and
Ravid (2018). Hence by their Theorem 2, there exists an equilibrium (α˜1, β˜1, µ˜1)
which achieves envq v0(πˆ) = u
∗
S. Moreover, we must have
∫ 1
0
US (α˜1(m1)) dω = u
∗
S, (48)
for every (compound) message m1 such that µ˜(m1) > 0. Let (αˆ, βˆ, µˆ) be the
replica of (α˜1, β˜1, µ˜1) constructed as in the proof of Lemma 12. It would be an
equilibrium of the original environment if π0 = πˆ.
Let x¯ and β¯ be the communication strategy and updating rule that γ0-attain πˆ
from the proof of Lemma 1. Consider the tuple (α,β, µ) described as follows. The
sender first draws (but does not deliver) messages mˆ0 using xˆ, and m¯ ∈ {m′, m′′}n
using x¯. She only sends non-informative public messagesm0 = ∅. If m¯r = m′, then
r receives the private message mpr = (m
′, mˆ0). Otherwise, he receives the private
message mpr = (m
′′). β is derived from µ using Bayes’ rule. Actions are given by
αr(∅, (m′, mˆ0), ω) = α˜1(mˆ0, ω), and αr(∅, m′′, ω) = a′′ with a′′ = minBR(βr(m′′)).
By construction, we have that β(∅, (m′, mˆ0)) = β˜1(mˆ0). Therefore, the strat-
egy αr(∅, (m′, mˆ0), ω) is a best response for the senders. Since (αˆ, βˆ, µˆ) would be
an equilibrium if π0 = πˆ, the sender cannot benefit from manipulating mˆ0. Hence,
if u∗S ≥ US(a′′), then (α,β, µ) is an equilibrium. Since there are always n0 players
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who receive message m′ and their actions lead to u∗S (because of (48)), this would
imply v∗ ≥ att envq v0(π0).
Otherwise, u∗S < u˜S(a
′′). In this case, note that π0 is a convex combination
of πˆ and βr(∅, m′′). And, in turn pˆ ∈ co{β(∅, (m′, mˆ0)) | µ˜(mˆ0) > 0}. Note that
v0(βr(∅, m′′) ≥ US(a′′) > u∗S, and v0(βr(∅, (m′, mˆ0)) ≥ u∗S (because of (48). Hence,
envq v0(π0) ≥ u∗S = att envq v0(π0), and the desired inequality v∗ ≥ att envq v0(π0)
follows from Lemma 13.
Step 3 (v∗ ≤ att envq v0(π0))—Let u∗S be an arbitrary equilibrium value. From
Lemma 12, there exists a symmetric equilibrium (α,β, µ) that generates u∗S. Let
m be a message profile such that µ(m) > 0. Under assumption 5, there must exist
a set R(m) with ‖R(m)‖ ≥ n0 and such that sup{US(αr(mr, ω)) |ω ∈ [0, 1]} ≥ u∗S
for every r ∈ R(m). Let P 0 be the set corresponding set of posterior beliefs,
P 0 =
{
βr(mr)
∣∣∣ µ(m) > 0 and r ∈ R(m)} . (49)
It follows that
u∗S ≤ inf
{
v0(π)
∣∣∣ π ∈ P 0} . (50)
Consider the alternative communication strategy µ′ with only two (compound)
messages m′ and m′′ described as follows. The sender first draws a profile m
according to µ (but does not deliver it). Receiver r receives message m′ if and
only if r ∈ R(m). Since (α,β, µ) is symmetric, π¯ := βr(m′) does not depend on r.
The martingale property of Bayes’ rule implies that π¯ ∈ co(P 0). Since there are
always at least n0 receivers in R(m), it follows that π¯ is γ0-attainable. Therefore
u∗S ≤ inf
pi∈P 0
v0(π) ≤ inf
pi∈P 0
envq v0(π) ≤ inf
pi∈co(P 0)
envq v0(π)
≤ envq v(p¯) ≤ att envq v0(π0). (51)
The first inequality is just (50). The second inequality follows because envq v0
majorizes v0. The third one because envq v0 is quasiconcave. The fourth one
because infimums are lower bounds. The last one from the fact that p¯ is γ0-
attainable. Since, u∗S was an arbitrary equilibrium payoff, it follows that v
∗ ≤
att envq v0(π0). 
Proof of Proposition 6. If v0 is quasi-concave then envq v0 = v0. If v
∗ > envq v0
then Π 6= {π0}. Lemma 1 thus implies γ0 < 1. 
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Proof of Proposition 7. Since Π is ⊆-decreasing in γ0, att envq v0 is weakly de-
creasing. Hence (i) follows from Theorem 5. (iii) is a corollary of Proposition 3,
and (ii) is a corollary of Proposition 4 and Assumption 5. 
A.4. Applications and extensions
Proof of Proposition 8. We are interested in equilibria in which the event is backed
for sure. If the project gets backed, the expected utility for a receiver with beliefs
π can be written as
∫
Θ
uR(ar, θ) dπ(θ) = θpi log(w + ρ0ar) + (1− θpi) log(w − ar), (52)
where θpi :=
∫
Θ θ dπ(θ). The first order condition for an interior maximum is thus
θpi
ρ
w + ρar
− (1− θpi) 1
w − ar = 0. (53)
This condition yields the best response function
BR(π) = min
{
0,
w
ρ
(θpi(1 + ρ)− 1)
}
. (54)
If ρ > 1, then
∫
Θ θ dπ0(θ) = 1/2 > 1/(1 + ρ). This means that receivers are
willing to make pledge a positive amount BR(π0) = w(ρ− 1)/2ρ > 0 without any
information transmission. In this cases, it suffices to have n > 2ρη/w(ρ − 1) to
have a babbling equilibriun in which the project gets backed. The interesting case
is when ρ < 1, so that BR(π0) = 0. In this case, receivers need to be persuaded
to make a positive pledge.
Let n′ = min{k ∈ N k ≥ nρ2/4} and γ = n′/n ≥ ρ2/4. Using ρ < 1, it can
be shown that n′ ≤ n − 1 as long as n ≥ 2. From the analysis of Example 5 in
Section 2, it follows that there is a γ-attainable belief πγ such that
∫
Θ
θ dπγ(θ) =
1
1 +
√
γ
. (55)
Using the strategy that γ-attains this belief, the sender can guarantee a total
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investment greater than
n′BR(πγ) = n
′w
ρ
(
1 + ρ
1 +
√
γ
− 1
)
≥ nρ
2
4
w
ρ
(
1 + ρ
1 + ρ/2
− 1
)
= n · wρ
4
· ρ
2 + ρ
> n · wρ
2
12
≥ 12η
wρ2
· wρ
2
12
= η, (56)
where the first equality follows from (54) and (55), the first inequality from the
definition of n′ and γ, the second equality from simple algebra, the second inequal-
ity from ρ < 1, and the last inequality from n ≥ 12η/wρ2. Since the project gets
backed for sure, the sender has no incentive to deviate and the proposed strategy
profile constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 9. (≥) Let u∗S = att env v0(π0). There exists some pˆ ∈ Π such
that u∗S = env v0(pˆ). By Caratheodory’s theorem there exist beliefs p1, . . . , pK
and weights µ ∈ ∆K with K ≤ nΘ + 1 such that pˆ = ∑Kk=1 µkpk, and u∗S =∑K
k=1 µkv0(pk). Under Assumption 5, there exist actions a1, . . . , aK such that
v0(pk) = u˜S(ak) and ak ∈ BR(pk). The result then follows from Proposition 1 in
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
(≤) Let u∗S be the expected payoff to the sender from a commitment pro-
tocol (α,β, µ). Note that the arguments from the proof of Lemma 12 can be
applied to commitment protocols. Hence, we can assume without loss of gen-
erality that (α,β, µ) is symmetric. Also, since there is no incentive compati-
bility constraint for the sender, we can assume without loss of generality that
US(αr(mr, ω)) = v0(βr(mr)) for every receiver r, ω ∈ [0, 1] and every message mr
such that µr(mr) > 0.
For every message profile m such that µ(m) > 0, let R(m) be a set consisting
of exactly n0 receivers such that v0(βr(mr)) ≥ v0(βr′(mr′)) for every r ∈ R(m)
and r 6∈ R(m). Note that
u∗S =
∫
Θ
∫
M0×M
1
n0
∑
r∈R(m)
v0(βr(mr)) dx(m|θ) dπ0(θ)
≤
∫
Θ
∫
M0×M
env v0(π¯(m)) dx(m|θ) dπ0(θ) ≤ env v0(π¯), (57)
where π¯(m) :=
∑
r∈R(m) βr(mr)/n0, π¯ :=
∫
Θ
∫
M0×M
π¯(m) dx(m|θ) dπ0(θ). The first
inequality follows from the definition of env, and the second one from Jensen’s
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inequality and the concavity of env v0. Using a communication strategy analogous
to the communication strategy µ′ from the proof of Theorem 5, it can be shown
that π¯ is γ0-attainable. Hence, (57) implies that u
∗
S ≤ Πenv v0(π0). Since u∗S was
arbitrary, it follows that v∗∗ ≤ Πenv v0(π0). 
Proof of Proposition 10. The proof is constructive. Let IK be the partition of
[0, 1) into K intervals of the form Ek = [(k − 1)/K, k/K), k = 1, . . . , K. Let
θ¯k = (2k− 1)/2K be the midpoint of the k-th interval. Let k(θ) denote the block
of IK containing θ. And let k
∗(θ) = argmin{(θ + b− θ¯k)2 | k = 1, . . . , K}.
Consider the tuple (α,β, µ) described as follows. The audience is randomly
divided into a target set T ⊆ R consisting of exactly n0 receivers, and R \ T .
When the state equals θ, receivers r 6∈ T are sent the message mr = k(θ), while,
receivers r ∈ T are always sent the message mr = k∗(θ). In other words, receivers
r 6∈ T are truthfully told which block of IK contains θ0, while receivers in T are
always told that θ0 ∈ Ek∗(θ0), whether this is true or not. The update rules β are
derived using Bayes’ rule. Receivers choose αr(mr) = E [ θ0|mr ].
Fix K. Since n0 is also fixed, there exists n¯ such that whenever n ≥ n¯
E [ θ0|mr = k ] ∈ Ek, and k∗(θ) = argmin{(θ + b − E [ θ0|k ])2 | k = 1, . . . , K}.
For such values of n, the proposed tuple is an equilibrium and it yields
u∗S = − (θ0 + b− E [ θ0|k∗(θ0) ])2 . (58)
If θ0+b ≤ 1, then θ0+b ∈ Ek∗(θ) and therefore u∗S ≥ −1/K. If not, then k∗(θ) = K
and u∗S ≥ −(b+ 1/K)2. 
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